Michigan Law Review
Volume 47

Issue 1

1948

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-FREEDOM OF SPEECHLIMITATIONS ON THE Used OF SOUND AMPLIFICATION DEVICES
Bernard Goldstone
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, and the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Bernard Goldstone, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-LIMITATIONS ON THE
Used OF SOUND AMPLIFICATION DEVICES, 47 MICH. L. REV. 111 (1948).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/13

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS

III

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-LIMITATIONS ON THE UsE OF SouNo AMPLIFICATION DEVICES-Appellant, a
minister of Jehovah's Witnesses, used, without a permit, sound equipment
mounted on his truck to amplify lectures on religious subjects. He was convicted in a police court for violating a municipal ordinance of Lockport, New
York. which prohibited the use of sound amplification devices without the permission of the chief of police. The ordinance provided no standards for the
guidance of the local officer in the issuance of the permit. The conviction was
affirmed by the county court and by the appellate court.1 On appeal, held,
reversed, four justices dissenting. The ordinance violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a previous restraint on
the right of free speech. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148
(1948).
The protection accorded to freedom of speech under the Fourteenth Amendment includes distribution of papers, handbills and magazines,2 noncommercial
canvassing from house to house, 8 the ringing of doorbells to distribute noncommercial literature,4 and the playing in the street of religious phonograph
records.G The principal case further extends this protection to include the
use of loud speakers, as the majority of the Court 6 believed such devices to be
a necessary means of communication under modern conditions of public speech. 7
Laws permitting discretionary or arbitrary action by licensing officials as a
prerequisite to exercising the freedoms of speech, press, and religion are unconstitutional,8 for such previous restraint would institute a system of license and

People v. Saia, 297 N.Y. 659, 76 N.E. (2d) 323 (1947).
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938).
3 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939).
~ Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943).
G Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
6 Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy and Rutledge.
7 Justice Douglas stated, "The sound truck has become an accep.ted method of
political campaigning. It is the way people are reached." Principal case at 561.
8 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
(Ordinance
which required permit from local official to distribute religious matter held void};
1

2
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censorship in its clearest form. 9 Justice Douglas, speaking for the maJonty,
applied this rule to the ordinance in the principal case.10 The dissenting
judges 11 believed the question was one of municipal regulation of a potential
nuisance, rather than regulation of free speech.12 It is well settled that state
regulation of liberty which is reasonable in relation to its subject matter, and
which is adopted to interests of the community, .does not deny due process.18
Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, reasoned that it does not violate the right of
free speech to let a public official determine what is in effect a nuisance merely
because he might outrageously misuse such authority, for judicial remedies are
available for such abuses of authority.14 Although the result of the principal case
seems correct, considering the broad language of the ordinance, clearly some
regulation is needed. The public should be protected from undue intrusion
and annoyance. An ordinance completely prohibiting the use of sound amplification devices for noncommercial purposes 15 would probably be void as infringing upon the exercise of free speech.16 There does not appear to be grave
and immediate danger to interests the state may lawfully protect.17 Although
the exact type of ordinance the court would accept is not too clear, the tenor
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938) (ordinance which
requires permit from local official to distribute literature held void) ; Hague v. C.l.O.,
307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939) (ordinance which requires a license from a
local official to hold public assembly held void).
9
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938).
10
Justice Douglas stated: "He stands athwart the channels of communication
as an obstruction which can be removed only after criminal trial and conviction and
lengthy appeal. A more effective previous restraint is difficult to imagine." Principal
case at 561.
11
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Reed and Burton, with Justice Jackson
writing a separate dissent.
12
Justice Frankfurter stated: "To the founding fathers it would hardly seem a
proof of progress in the development of our democracy that the blare of sound trucks
must be treated as a necessary medium in the deliberative process." Principal case at
565. Justice Jackson reasoned that this was not a free speech issue but was really
a question of regulating or prohibiting the irresponsible introduction of sound equipment. Principal case at 567.
18
,
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578 (1937).
14
_ Principal case at 562.
But consider Justice Robert's statement: " ••• the
availability of judicial remedy for abuses in a system of licensing still leaves that system
one of previous restraint, which in the field of free speech and press we have held
inadmissible." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 at 306, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
15
To the effect that ordinances prohibiting the use of loud speaker trucks for
commercial purposes are valid, see Brachey v. Maupin, 277 Ky. 467, 126 S.W. (2d)
881 (1939); Maupin v. Louisville, 284 Ky. 195, 144 S.W. (2d) 237 (1940).
16
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S.Ct. 669 (1943) (an ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of handbills on the public streets held void). But state
courts hold ordinances prohibiting the use of loud speakers valid. See Kovacs v.
Cooper, 135 N.J.L. 584, 52 A. (2d) 806 (1947); Hamilton v. City of Montrose,
109 Colo. 228, 124 P. (2d) 757 (1942).
17
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624; 63 S.Ct.
1178 (1943). .
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of the principal case is that the ordinance giving authority to a local official to
issue permits will have to be narrowly drawn to regulate the hours and places
of use, the volume of sound, and other local considerations.18 Such an ordinance makes the local officer's function ministerial in nature. Another possibility would be a narrowly drawn ordinance regulating the time, place and
volume and requiring no permit at all, thereby eliminating any exercise of
discretion by a local official. Either of the above ordinances would be regulatory and objective and would remove any danger of previous restraint such as
confronted the court in the principal case.
Bernard Goldstone

18 Principal case at 560. See also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61
S.Ct. 762 (1941).

